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PREFACE 
The investigation of water resource systems has been sn important part of 
resources- and environment-related research at IIASA since its inception. As 
demand for water increases relative to supply, the intensity and efficiency of 
water resources management must be improved. This in turn requires an increase 
in the degree of detail and sophstication of the analysis. The economic. social, 
and environmental impacts of various water resource development options are 
evaluated with the aid of mathematical modeling techniques. to generate inputs 
for planning, design, and operational decisions. 
During 1978 it was decided to a ~ t e m p t  an integration of the results of our 
studies on water demand with water supply considerations. This new task was 
named "Regional Water Management" (Task 1 .  Resources and Environment 
Area). 
This paper considers the application of systems analysis to water rnanage- 
ment problems in Western Skgne, Sweden. These problems concern the alloca- 
tion of limited supplies of water and related land resources for several mutually 
conflicting purposes, e.g., municipal, industrial, agricultural, and recreational 
water use. 
This paper is part of a collaborative study on water resources in Western 
Skgne. Sweden, between the Swedish Environmental Protection Board. the 
University of Lund, and IIASA, and concerns a joint municipal water supply 
project. The viability of the project depends on the number of municipalities 
taking part. This paper is concerned with the methodological problems involved 
in allocating the costs of the joint project to  provide incentives for the munici- 
palities to participate. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
A central problem in planning the provision of goods or services by a public en- 
terprise is how to determine a "fair" or "just" allocation of joint costs. Thls 
problem is particularly acute in the development of a common water resource 
like a multipurpose reservoir, where the greater cost-effectiveness of larger facil- 
ities means that the sum of the marginal costs* of each participant may be much 
less than the total cost of the project. The literature on water resources contains 
a variety of proposals for dealing with thls lund of problem, some of which antic- 
ipate ideas (like the core) later developed in game theory (Ransmeier 1941; see 
also Loughlin 1977, Heaney 1979, and Straffin and Heaney 1980). 
The methods most commonly used in current water resource planning prac- 
tice are (i) to allocate costs in proportion to some single numerical criterion like 
use, population, or level of benefit;or (ii) to allocate certain costs (e.g., marginal 
costs) directly, and divide the remainder on the basis of some scheme similar to 
(i).  Chief among the methods of the second type is the so-called separable costs- 
remaining benefits (SCRB) method, which is used for multipurpose reservoir 
projects in the United States (Inter-Agency Committee on Water Resources 1958. 
Eckstein 1958) and in other countries. This method will be treated in more de- 
tail in Section 6. 
The same type of problem has also been extensively treated in the econom- 
ics literature on public utility pricing. An approach commonly advocated here 
is Ramsey pricing (Ramsey 1927), which is based on the idea of setting prices 
to maximize some criterion of economic efficiency, like consumer surplus, sub- 
ject to a breakeven constraint (Baumol and Bradford 1970). This approach relies 
on having extensive information about the demand for the goods and services 
over a range of consumption levels - information that is often not available in 
The m-al cost of including a participant is defined as the difference between the estimated cost of 
the joint project excluding him and the estimated cost of the joint project including him. 
practice. especially for a resocrrce. like water. in which established markets may 
not w e n  exist. Ramsey pricing is also less suitable for planning long-term invest- 
ments. where future demand can only be estimated. 
4 third strand in the literature comes from the theory of cooperative games. 
which provides various normative approaches to the problem of allocating joint 
costs ( and  benefits) among users by taking the strategic possibilities into ac- 
count. Among the most commonly used of these game theory concepts are the 
Shaplcy vallre and the nucleoh~s. The application of these ideas to water resource 
projects is increasing: for a sample of the recent literature see Loehman and 
Whinston i 1974).  Suzuki and Nakayama ! 1976). Bogardi and Szidarovsky 
( 1  976). Okada ( 1977). and Loehman rr al. ( 1979).  Methods from the theory of 
cooperative games are particularly well-suited to  contexts like water resources 
development in which the basic decision is often whether o r  not to  supply a 
potential class of usersat some targeted level. the implicit assumption being that 
this level is close to  the optimal scale of development. The advantage is that the 
analysis is not made to depend o n  precise estimations of future demand curves. 
but only on  "point" estimates of benefits. The disadvantage is that even such 
point estimates are often unreliable; moreover, it is implicitly assumed in the 
analysis that the optimal scale of development is known - which ultimately pre- 
sumes that demands as well as costs are known. It has recently been shown that 
these shortcomings may be overcome by designing an appropriate noncoopera- 
tive game, which reveals both consumer demands and the optimal scale of devel- 
opment,  and at  the same time allocates costs in a manner consistent with prin- 
ciples of cooperative equity (Young 1980). 
The complexity of the cost allocation problem has led some authors to  
conclude that there is no  economically justifiable way t o  allocate joint costs (see 
Ransmeier 1 942, Thomas 1 974). Nevertheless, in practice, the costs of a project 
must usually be allocated in some way among the beneficiaries. The purpose of 
this paper is to compare the merits of traditional methods of allocating costs 
with several well-known. and other lesser-known, methods from cooperative 
game theory. The analysis consists of two parts. First, we discuss certain estab- 
lished principles of "fairness" by which the different methods can be judged. 
Second. we compare the solutions given by each method for an actual example: 
a cost sharing problem among a group of municipalities in Sweden who wish to 
develop a joint municipal water supply. The object of t h s  analysis is not to pro- 
vide a strict axiomatic characterization of methods, but rather to explore their 
behavior in practice. Our conclusion is that, of the traditional approaches, pro- 
portional allocation according to  a single numerical criterion may be preferable 
to the more complicated SCRB method, provided that the proportionality crite- 
rion seems fair and [he accuracy of the values is not open to dispute. The SCRB 
method is shown to be seriously flawed in that it is not monotonic in total costs 
- that is, an increase in total costs may result in some participants having to pay 
less than before; this is due to  the ad hoc way in which marginal costs are intro- 
duced. The game theory methods require more information and are more compli- 
cated; moreover, one  of the best-known of these methods, the nucleolus, is also 
not monotonic in total costs. By contrast, a lesser-known variation of the nucle- 
olus. the proportiorla1 nz~cleolzls, passes most of the tests of fairness considered 
here and would appear to  merit serious consideration for cost allocation in water 
resources development. 
2 JOINT COST FUNCTIONS 
Consider three neighboring municipalities A, B, and C, who can supply chem- 
selves with municipal water either by building separate facilities or by building 
a joint water supply facility. We suppose that the joint facility is cheaper co con- 
struct than the separate projects due t o  economies of scale. The quantity of 
water to  be supplied to  each municipality is assumed given. The problem is then 
how t o  divide the costs among them. 
Figure 1 shows the population of each municipality. the amounts of water 
to  be supplied, and the cost of building separate facilities. Table 1 gives water use 
per capita and the unit cost of supplying water in each municipality. 
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FIGURE 1 Three hypothetical municipalities A, B, and C, their populations, water demands, 
and the cost of building separate facilities. 
Table 3 shows the costs of supplying the target amounts for different com- 
binations. A11 possibilities are considered: A and B build a joint facility and C 
goes alone; B and C cooperate and A goes alone. and so on.  
TABLE 1 Annual rates of water use and unit costs of 
supplying water in three hypothetical municipalities. 
Use per capita Unit cost 
Municipality (m3) (Urn3) 
TABLE 2 Annual costs of water supply under various 
combinations. 
Cost breakdown Total cost 
Combination (S X lo6) (5 X lo6) 
The cost figures show that building a facllity to  serve all three communities 
will be 1.6 million dollars cheaper than if three separate facilities were built. 
However, A and B together can also realize savings of 9400,000 without includ- 
ing C; similarly, B and C can save $400,000 without including A. A and C, being 
geographically separated by B, cannot d o  any better by building a joint facility 
than they could by building separate facilities. The most cost-effective way of 
supplying water would be t o  build a joint facility serving all three communities. 
More generally, let { l  ,~....JI } = iV represent a group of prospective partici- 
pants in a cooperative venture to  provide a product o r  service to  members of the 
group. The cost of serving a subgroup S, denoted by c(S), is found by consider- 
ing the least-cost alrernatil~e of providing the same service, eitherjointly o r  singly, 
to  the members of S independently of how the others are served. The joinr cosr 
funcrion c(S) so defined must be subaddirive, i.e., must satisfy c(S) + c(73 >, 
c(S U 7') for any two nonoverlapping groups S and T ,  because the ways of serv- 
ing S together with T include the possibility of serving S alone and T alone. 
Thus, in the above example, municipalities A and C would find it quite costly 
to  build a single joint facility because of their geographical separation; hence the 
least-cost alternative would be to build one facility for X and another for C. 
If the cost of serving any group o i  users is simply the sum of the costs of 
serving them singly, then the cost allocation problem is trivial. The more interest- 
ing, and more typical, case arises when the cost of serving several users by some 
joint facility is less than the sum o i  serving them singly, that is c(iW < Z, c ( i ) .  
The cost  savings that would result from cooperating in a coalition S instead of 
going alone are 
The function v is called the cosrsavingsgame. T o  illustrate the different situations 
that can arise, suppose that the cost of serving a group S depends only on the 
number of members of S, and that  the cost savings are greatest for larger groups 
due to economies of  scale. One possibility is that the cost savings increase at  a 
greater rate with each additional participant, as shown in Figure 1. Another, and 
Size of coalit~on 
FIGURE 2 The cost savings of a joint project as a function of the size of the coalition: the 
rate of increase rises with each additional participant. 
perhaps more typical. situation is that the rate of increase first rises. then falls, 
as shown in Figure 3 .  
Size of coalition 
FIGURE 3 The cost savings of a joint project as a function of the size of the coalition: the 
rate of increase first rises, then falls. 
It is found that justifying a "fair" allocation of costs is considerably more 
difficult in the latter case than in the former. 
3 PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY: THE CORE 
"Equity" can have a wide range of meanings. When considering what it means 
for a cost allocation to be equitable, it is first helpful to ask ourselves why it 
should be equitable. The answer: to encourage the agreement or cooperation of 
those who pay the costs. Thus a reasonable test of the equity of a method is to  
see whether the participants agree in principle to the proposed allocation of 
costs. 
In practice, one of the most common ways of achieving agreement on the 
distribution of costs is simply to  allocate the  costs in proportion to a criterion 
which stands for benefits received. such as use of facilities, number of users. or  
indeed, the benefits themselves - if they can be reliably estimated. Ersatz mea- 
sures of benefits may actually be the more persuasive simply because their mag- 
nitudes are less open to dispute. This is the case in the municipal cost sharing 
problem discussed in Section 7. Here the costs to be shared relate to long-term 
investments, and future demand is conjectural at  best, so the populations of the 
municipalities have been used as the basis for allocation. 
One difficulty with allocating costs in this way is that it may conflict with 
some participants' perceptions of self-interest, and hence may not  provide suffi- 
cient incentive for cooperation. In  the municipality example above, an allocation 
of costs according to populations would result in the shares (in millions of dol- 
lars) : 
However. municipality A would find it hard to  accept such an allocation, since 
it could provide the same amount of water on  its own for only S6.5 million. 
An allocation made on the basis of use gives even worse results for A (in 
millions of dollars): 
The difficulty with "proportional" allocation methods is that they ignore one 
of the  fundamentals of  the problem - the alternative costs embodied in the 
joint cost function c i a .  It is a minimum requirement of a fair allocation that it 
be individually rational: no user should pay more in the joint venture than he 
would have to  pay on his own. This principle was stated by Ransmeier 0 942) 
for the Tennessee Valley Authority projects, and is well established in the litera- 
ture (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944).  It is a fundamental concept of 
fairness since it constitutes the minimum incentive for an individual to join. To 
be individually rational, the costs y allocated to A, B,  and C in the above exam- 
ple must satisfy yA < 6.5, y B  < 4.2, yc < 1.5, where + y B  + yc = S 10.6 
million. 
The same argument can be applied to groups of participants as well as to 
individuals and indeed was so stated by Ransmeier (1942). Consider, for exam- 
ple, neighboring municipalities A and B: they can build a joint facility for 510.3 
million, so it would certainly be unfair to allocate them more than S 10.3 million 
in total costs. Not only would it be unfair, but also, if cooperation is voluntary, 
there is a risk of A and B backing out if they have an allocation .v, + y B  > 10.3, 
since they can do better as a pair. The condition that no group pay more than 
its alternative cost is the principle of group ranonality. Since a group may con- 
sist of asingle participant, group rationahty implies individual rationality. Figure 
4 shows the set of all (nonnegative) allocations of $10.6 million among A, B, and 
C, the shaded area being the subset of allocations satisfying group rationality. 
In the general case, where there are n independent users { 1.2, ..., n )  = iV 
and alternative costs are given by the function cCS), the condition for group ra- 
tionality for a cost allocation y = 01, 2, ,..., y,), C y i  = c(*\T), is that 
iv 
$ yi c(S, for all S C iV (1) 
A second principle with firm roots in the economics and project evaluation 
literature is that no participant should be charged less than the marginal cost 
(sometimes called the separable cost) of including bun in the project (Federal 
Inter-Agency River Basin Committee 1950, Inter-Agency Committee on Water 
Resources 1958, Water Resources Council 1962). For example, it costs $10.6 
mdlion to serve A, B, and C but only $8.0 million to serve A and C. Therefore 
the marginal (or separable) cost of serving B is $10.6 - $8.0 = $2.6 million, so 
it seems only fair that B should pay at least t h s  amount. This concept is called 
individual marginal cost coverage. The marginal costs for A, B, and C are S5.3, 
2.6, and 0.3 mdlion, respectively. 
There is an obvious extension of t h s  idea to  groups. For example, the mar- 
ginal cost of including the group {A,B ) is S 10.6 - $ 1.5 = $9.1 million. The 
principle of marginal cost coverage states that every group of users should be 
charged at least the additional cost of serving them. Thls is only fair, since if y ,  
+ ye  < 9.1, then C would be subsidizing A and B. 
The idea of fiiding prices in which users do not subsidize each other in the 
use of a given public service or facility is also well-known in the theory of regu- 
lated public utilities (Faulhaber 1975, Zajac 1978). 
Stated in general terms, the marginality principle is that a cost allocation y 
should satisfy 
f Y, 2 c(M - c(N - S) for all S C N (21 
3 from 7 1 
from Q 
from 
FIGURE 4 Allocations of 510.6 million among A. B. and C.  The shaded area is the subset 
satisfying group rationality. 
The argument for group rationality is based on strategic considerations, i.e.. 
providing sufficient incentive for potential users to cooperate, whereas marginal- 
ity can be viewed as a general concept of fairness that can be applied even if co- 
operation is mandated. However. an inspection of these two ideas reveals that 
they are in fact equivalent, given that all costs must be allocated, i.e., that Z,v y i  
= cf1V). 
In game theory it is customary to interpret the two equivalent conditions 
( 1 ) and ( 2 )  in terms of the cost savings game v. 
Any allocarion y of costs implies a corresponding impumtior~ x of savings: 
if ,vi is the cost assessed for i then the amount i saves by cooperating rather than 
going alone,.r,,is given by ,vi = c( i )  -xi. In terms of v ,  the condition of individ- 
ual rationality says thatxi 2 0 for every participant i ;  group rationality says that 
2 x i  2 v(S) for all S C N 
S 
The set of all vectors .r satisfying ( 3 )  is called the core of the game v .  
In our example the core is the set of solutions to the following inequalities: 
The shape of the core can be seen from the corresponding cost allocations in 
Figure 4. 
The core provides a guideline for cost allocation by narrowing down the 
class of acceptable imputations, but it does not usually identify a unique answer. 
However, there is always the unfortunate possibility that there may be no core 
imputations: that is, no cost allocations that are either g o u p  rational or satisfy 
marginality. That this can happen in perfectly reasonable situations may be seen 
from the example of Figure 3.  Here there are increasing returns to scale, but the 
rate of increase f i t  rises, then falls. The minimum savings that can be realized 
by all seven users together is 63,  but no matter how these savings are distributed, 
some group of five will receive at most 45, even though they could save more 
( 4 8 )  as a subcoalition. 
In such an example, a quick test to see whether the core is empty is to draw 
a line from the origin to the point corresponding to the total number of users: 
this line segment must lie above the savings curve for the core to be nonempty 
(Shapley and Shubik 1973). In more complicated examples the feasibility o f  con- 
dition (3) can be checked using linear programming. In the three-municipality 
example, the core is small; if the total cost c(X,B,C) had happened to be 512.0 
million instead o f  5 10.6 million the core would have been empty. 
Thus, core imputations are not bound to exist; however, the greater the 
economies of scale, the more likely a core is to be present. Moreover, when core 
imputations exist, they are typically not unique. 
4 METHODS EXTENDING THE CORE 
One approach to resolving the twin difficulties of nonexistence and nonunique- 
ness has been to look for some natural way of  strengthening (or relaxing) the in- 
equalities defining the core. Ttus is one of the most common approaches in game 
theory literature. Three such methods will be discussed here: the least core and 
its specialization, the nucleolus; and two variations, the weak least core and 
weak nucleolus, and the proportional least core and proportional nucleolus. 
4. I The Lemt Core and Nucleoltcs 
If the core of the cost savings game v is empty, the best alternatives of some sub- 
groups are very good - in a certain sense "too" good - relative to the best alter- 
native of the whole group. Hence we might consider imposing a tax on all proper 
subgroups as a way of encouraging the whole group to stick together. The least 
core is found by imposing the smallest uniform tax e such that if all coalitions 
other than the whole group pay this tax, then a core imputation exists. Thus we 
require the least E for which there exists an imputation x satisfying: 
C xi  > v(S) - E for all S C :V 
S 
(5) 
C .Ki = b'(l\? 
N 
The least core is the set of all imputationsx satisfying(5) for this least E (Shapley 
and Shubik 1973). The corresponding allocations of costs are found by letting 
y i  = c ( i )  -xi for all i. Because of our assumptions about v ,  it can be shown that 
the resu1t.i~ always individually rational, i.e., that x > 0. 
Suppose, on the other hand, that the cost savings game v already has a core, 
and it is necessary to find a unique solution. One way of narrowing down the 
choice is to imagine subsidizing all coalitions other than the whole group by a 
uniform amount E .  This amounts to solving (5) for smallest e and allowing e to 
go negative. 
Computing the least core involves solving a linear program. For the three- 
municipality example, tfus program (in millions of dollars) is: 
min E 
subject to 
The solution is E = -0.533, x, = x B  = xc = 0.533, and the corresponding 
unique cost allocation is y A  = 5.967, y B  = 3.667, and yc = 0.967. 
In some cases the linear program (5) may have several solutions. If so, the 
following "tie-breaking" device may be used: 
For any imputationx = (x, , x2 ,...,.r ,) and coalition S. define the excess of 
S to be v(S) - Zs x i .  Let el (xi be the largest excess of any coalition relative to 
x,  e2 (x) the second largest excess, e3 (x) the next, and so on. The least core is 
the set X1 of all x that minimize e l  (x). Let X2 be the set of all x in X1 that 
minimize e2 (x), X 3  the set of all x in X 2  that minimize e3 (x), and so on. Thls 
process eventually leads to an Xk consisting of a single computation 2, called 
the nucleolus (Maschler et al. 1979, Schmeidler 1969). 
3.2 The Weak Least Core and Weak Nucleolus 
Suppose that a minimum uniform tax is imposed on any individual user who 
takes some course of action other than joining the whole group. Thus we find 
the least E for which there is a solution x to the system: 
C x i  > v(S) - EISI for all S C N 
S 
Z x i  = v(iV 
N 
The set of all corresponding imputations x is the weak least core. * For the 
above example. the weak least core is calculated by solving the linear program 
(in millions of dollars): 
rnin E 
'For arbirrary e the set of dl solutions ro (7) has been called the "weak e-core" (Shapley and Shubik 
1973); hence rhe designation "weak least core" in this case. 
subject to 
The unique solution is E = 4 . 4 ,  x, = 0 . 4 , ~ ~  = 0.8, xc = 0.4, and the corre- 
sponding allocation of costs is y ,  = 6.1, y B  = 3.4, and yc = 1. I. 
A choice between multiple solutions can be made as in the computation 
of the nucleolus by defining the excess of S to be [v(S) - Cs .ri]/lSI. We call 
the result the weak nucleolus. This method, whde superficially similar to the 
least core, turns out to  have an important property not shared by the least core; 
however, it also suffers from additional drawbacks (see Section a).* 
4.3 The Proportional Least Core and Proportional ;Vucleolw 
Another variation on this theme is to modify the core by imposing a minimum 
tax (or subsidy) on all coalitions in proportion to their cost. Thus we postulate 
a tax rate t and solve the system 
min t 
subject to 
C . r . > ( l  s  ' -t)v(S) foral lSCiV 
C xi = v(M ( 9 )  
.v 
A minimum t exists provided v(S) > 0 for some S f :V. A choice between multi- 
ple solutions can be made as in the computation of the nucleolus by defming the 
excess of a coalition S to be [v(S) - Cs .ri]/v(S). [If v(S) = 0 we adopt the con- 
vention that alO > b/O if a > b. ] 
For the above example the linear program (9) becomes 
'One of these is that it may not be individually rational when the core 1s empty. This difficulty may be 
overcome by requiring that r > 0. a concept studied by Grotte under [he name "normalized nucleolus" 
(Grotte 1970,1976).  We prefer not to  use thig designation because there are other natural ways of normal- 
izing (see Section 4.3). 
14 
subject to 
min t 
The unique solution is t = -3, x ,  = 0, x B  = 1.6, .rc = 0, and the corresponding 
cost allocation is y ,  = 6.5, y B  = 2.6, and yc  = 1.5. 
In other words, all of the savings in costs are allocated to B. The explana- 
tion for this is that B has effective veto power: neither .A nor C can do any bet- 
ter than going alone without forming a coalition that includes B. For other solu- 
tion concepts related to the core see Charnes et al. (1978), Maschler et al. 
(1979), and Heaney (1979). 
5 THE SHAPLEY VALUE 
The Shapley value for n players is given by the formula 
This is one of the earliest methods of allocation to be based on a consistent 
set of postulates about how an allocation should be made (Shapley 1953). All 
players are assumed to "sign up" in some particular order. If a group S has already 
signed up and i was the last member of the group to amve, hls marginal cost 
contribution to S is c(S) - c(S - i). The Shapley value is i's average marginal 
contribution if all orders for signing up are assumed to be equally Likely. 
The Shapley values for municipalities A, B, and C are calculated in Table 3. 
The fmt column shows the six possible orders for signing up; the next three col- 
umns show the marginal contribution of each municipality. 
TABLE 3 The Shapley values for municipalities A, B, 
and C. 
Marginal contribution (5  X l o 6 )  
Order of signing A B 
ABC 6.5 3.8 
AC B 6.5 2.6 
BAC 6.1 4.2 
BCA 5 3 4.2 
CAB 6.5 2.6 
CBA 5.3 3.8 
Total 36.2 21.2 
Shapley valuea 6.033 3.533 
 he Shapley value is calculated by dividing the sum of the possible mar- 
ginal contributions for each municipality (Total) by the number of pos- 
sible orders of signing (6). 
6 THE SEPARABLE COSTS-REMAINING BENEFITS (SCRB) METHOD 
The last method to be considered here is one commonly used in practice for 
allocating the costs of multipurpose water development projects. The SCRB 
method is based on the simple and appealing idea that joint costs should be al- 
located, more or less, in proportion to the willingness of the user to pay. The 
"more or less" element is introduced because the proportional allocation is only 
performed after first assigning to each user his marginal (or separable) cost, and 
then taking as the criterion of proportionality each user's willingness to pay 
minus the marginal cost already allocated. 
Specifically, let b(i) be the benefit to user I and c(i) hls alternative cost. 
Evidently i would not be willing to pay more than min{b(i),c(i)} (sometimes 
called his justifiable expenditure) to participate in the joint project. The mar- 
ginal cost of including i is cl(i) = c(N) - c(iV - i), which is less than or equal to 
c(i) because the cost function is subadditive. In the SCRB nomenclature, i's 
"remaining benefit" di) is his willingness to pay minus his marginal cost: r(i) = 
min{b(i),c(i)j- c'fi). Note that if r(i) < 0, then cl(i) > b(i) and user I should 
not be included in the project. Therefore we can assume that all remaining bene- 
titsr(i) are nonnegative. The remaining costs are c(lV - C, c ' ~ )  and are allocated 
in proportion to the remaining benefits: 
Using the marginal costs given in Section 3 ,  the remaining benefits (in mil- 
lions of dollars) for A, B, and C are calculated to be: 
Toral = 4.0 
The nonseparable costs are 10.6 - (5.3 + 2.6 + 0.3) = 2.4, so the SCRB alloca- 
tion (in millions of  dollars) is: 
Variations of the SCRB method include proposals for allocating the nonseparable 
costs in proportion to some criterion such as use, priority of use, or population 
(James and Lee 1971). The difficulty with the SCRB method is that the simple 
underl-fing idea of allocating costs in proportion to benefits is lost by the ad hoc 
introduction of marginal costs; t h s  leads to some strange results, as will be 
shown in Section 8. 
7 A CASE STUDY OF SWEDEN 
The area studied consists of 18 municipalities in the Sk%ne region of southern 
Sweden (Figure 5). At present, most of the municipal water supply is drawn from 
three sources: local groundwater, and two separate pipeline systems which dis- 
tribute water from two lakes, Vombsjon and Ringsjon. 
As early as the 1940s, certain municipalities in the area realized that local 
water sources might not be sufficient to meet future demand, and turned their 
attention to off-site sources. An association called the Sydvatten Company * was 
formed by several of them to plan the long-term water supply for the region. In 
the late 1960s, this group started to design a major project for obtaining water 
from a lake outside the region (Lake Bolrnen) via an 80-km tunnel. 
'South Water Company. 
FIGURE 5 The re@on studied in Sk%ne, Sweden, and its division into municipalities. 
The viability of the project depends on the number of additional munici- 
palities that can be induced to  participate in the project. This, in turn, depends 
on how much these municipalities will be obliged to pay for participation, bear- 
ing in mind the avadability and costs of developing their own on-site resources. 
Moreover, there have been several unforeseen developments since the initiation 
of the project (e.g., greatly escalated costs, more optimistic cstimates of local 
resources, and lower rates of demand growth), and these have brought the pres- 
ent population-based cost allocation procedure into question. 
The basic concepts and methods developed in the preceding sections can 
be illustrated by .?plying them to the Swedish case over the decade 1970-1980, 
since data and forecasts for this period are readily avadable. The Sydvatten tun- 
nel project mentioned earlier is not expected to have any impact on water 
supply until the late 1980s, and so only conventional alternatives can be consid- 
ered for meeting incremental demands over the period studied (e.g., extending 
the capacity of the pipeline system and increasing the use of local groundwater 
sources where feasible). The base year was taken to be 1970, and a water supply 
system was designed to satisfy the municipal "requirements" for 1980 as they 
were forecast in 1970. The different cost allocation methods described above 
were then applied to the system to examine the relative positions of the differ- 
ent municipalities. The results help clarify the way in which the different meth- 
ods work, and why some of them may be preferable to others in practice. 
7.1 Identifying Independent Actors 
The first problem in defining the cost function is to identify the independent 
actors in the system. To develop the costs for each of the 218 - 1 = 361,143 
possible groupings of the 18 municipalities would be impractical and unrealistic. 
In practice. the municipalities fall into natural groups based on past associations, 
geographical location, existing water transmission systems, and hydrological and 
geographical features determining the natural routes for water transmission net- 
works. 
A careful study of these conditions led to the grouping of the 18 munici- 
palities into six independent units as shown in Figure 6. Group H, for example, 
consists of those municipalities which were already c o ~ e c t e d  by the Ringsjon 
water supply system in 1970, together with the municipality of Svalov, which 
would be located in the middle of the main transmission route. These groups are 
treated as single actors in the following analysis of alternative costs. Once a cost 
allocation for the groups has been determined, a further allocation of costs among 
the municipalities within each group could be made using a similar approach; 
however, this may not give the same result as if all municipalities were treated 
separately. The 1970 populations and forecast incremental water demands of 
each group are shown in Table 4. 
7.2 Ambiguities in Defining the Cost Function: Direct Costs 
In practice, ambiguities in defining the cost function arise due to the problem 
of direct costs, that is, costs that would be incurred by a given municipaliry no 
matter what course of action is pursued. For example, local water distribution 
systems are required w i t h  municipalities whether the water is supplied jointly 
or separately. The cost associated with municipal distribution systems may there- 
fore be regarded as a direct cost. In principle, these costs could be excluded from 
the cost function on the sounds  that they can be allocated independently. How- 
ever, in practice, the borderline between direct and indirect costs is not always 
clear. In some municipalities, for instance, the water delivered by the regional 
Group Municipalir~es ~n rhe grouo 
A ~ n g e l h o l m .  Hoqanas. Kliooan, Asrorp. Biuv 
H Hels~ngborg. Landskrona. Svalov. Eslov 
K KEvl~nge. Lsmma - aoundaries o f  each group 
L Lund  E x ~ s r ~ n g  warer network 
?dl Malrno. Burlijv, Staifansrorp --- Prolecred ,,vater n e r w o r ~  
T Trelleoorg. Vell~nge. Svedala 
FIGURE 6 The grouping of the 18 municipalities into six units, and the existing and 
projected water transmission networks. 
TABLE 4 Populations and incremental water demands 
of the six municipal goups.  
Population Incremental water demand 
Group jX lo3) (X lo6 m3/yr) 
A 85.0 . 6.71 
H 176.3 8.13 
K 26.8 3.75 
L 69 .O 3.53 
M 287.3 14.64 
T 59.5 6.21 
supply network must first be pumped up to a reservoir before distribution within 
the municipality; the facilities required for pumping depend on the pressure at 
the end of the transmission network. Thus the costs of these distribution facili- 
ties may not be independent of the method by which the water is supplied. The 
deftnition of the cost function naturally depends on the fraction of these costs 
treated as direct costs. 
Since the definition of the cost function is always somewhat arbitrary in 
practice, it is desirable to choose a cost allocation method that is insensitive to 
the inclusion of direct costs. One of the difficulties with the SCRB method is 
that in some cases it is sensitive to the inclusion of direct costs. None of the 
game theory methods considered here suffers from this drawback. 
7.3 Calculating the Cost Function 
The water supply system includes two lakes (Vombsjon and Ringsjon), one ma- 
jor groundwater aquifer (Alnarp), and other minor on-site sources. The possible 
routes of a water transmission network (based on a preliminary analysis) are also 
shown in Figure 6. 
To avoid inconsistencies in defining the cost function, it was assumed for 
the purpose of this study that the pressure at each demand point does not depend 
on the method by which the water is transmitted to  that point. Thus the cost 
of distributing the water within each municipality does not depend on the ar- 
rangement by which the water is supplied, so this element can be treated as a 
direct cost and excluded from the cost function. The water delivered to each 
municipality was assumed to  be of the same quality. The water was treated to 
bring it up to this level at the source, and the cost of treatment was included in 
the cost function. 
Cost functions for transmittineand treating water were based on the formu- 
las given in Appendix A.  Using these functions, the total costs c(S) associated 
with the least-cost combination of alternative supply sources were estimated for 
each coahtion S. The results are shown in Table 5 ;  commas signify that  the least- 
cost option of that coalitionis to  break up into the subcoalitions indicated. The 
unit costs (per million cubic meters per year) are: A, 3.37; H, 2.08; K, 2.91 ; 
L, 4.50; M, 1.17,; T ,  3.51. 
TABLE 5 Total costs (Skr X 1 o6 ) for  various joint supply systems. 
Group Total cost Group Total cost Group Total cost 
X 21.95 AHK 40.74 AHKL 48.95 
H 17.08 AHL 43.22 AHKM 60.25 
K 10.91 AH,M 55.50 AHK,T 62.72 
L 15.88 AH,T 56.67 XHL.M 64.03 
M 20.81 A,K,L 48.74 AHL.T 65.20 
T 2 1.98 A .KM 53.40 AH.MT 74.10 
A.K,T 54.84 AX,LM 63.96 
AH 34.69 A,LU 53.05 AX,L.T 70.72 
A X  32.86 X.L,T 59.81 AX,MT 72.27 
A,L 37.83 A,MT 61.36 A.LMT 73.41 
A,M 42.76 HKL 27.26 HKL,M 48.07 
A.T 43.93 HLM 42.55 HKL,T 49.24 
HK 22.96 HK,T 44.94 HKMT 59.35 
HL 25 .OO HLsM 45.8 1 HLMT 64.41 
H N  37.89 HL,T 46.98 KLUT 56.61 
H,T 39.06 H,MT 56.49 AHKL,T 70.93 
K,J- 16.79 K.LM 42.01 AHKLM 69.76 
ICM 3 1.45 K,L,T 48.77 AHKMT 77.42 
K,T 32.89 K,MT 50.32 AHLMT 83.00 
LM 31.10 LUT 51.46 AKLMT 73.97 
L,T 37.86 HKLMT 66.46 
MT 39.4 1 
AHKLMT 83.82 
The cost function reveals the relative strength of the different actors, which 
depends o n  factors such as the cost and availability o f  local resources, and access 
to  the resources of others. F o r  example, L finds that the unit cost of going alone 
is high; though it is located close to  the major regional sources (Ringsjon and 
Vombsjon), it owns neither. Hence it has a strong incentive to  participate in a 
joint scheme with the owners of the two sources, H and M. H a n d  M have the 
lowest unit costs because they own the two systems, but they can reduce their 
unit costs even further by including other municipalities in a joint scheme. due 
to economies of scale. However, the system owned by H (kngsjon) has a greater 
excess capacity than that owned by M (Vombsjon). Hence the incremental cost 
of other municipalities joining in a coalition with M is hgher than the incremen- 
tal cost of joining with H. The effect is that H has more to offer its partners in 
a coalition than does M, and thls will be reflected in the final cost allocation. 
8 COMPARISON OF METHODS 
Using the cost function developed above, we now compare the cost allocations 
of the different methods described in the preceding sections. We assume that all 
groups participate in a joint scheme at a total cost of Skr 83.82 million. The re- 
sults obtained from the two proportional allocation schemes based on demand 
and population and from the SCRB method are shown in Table 6, as are the 
Shapley value, the nucleolus, the weak nucleolus, and the proportional nucleo- 
lus. The cost shares allocated to each group by the seven methods are lllustrated 
in Figure 7 for ease of comparison. 
TABLE 6 Cost allocations of Skr 83.82 million by seven methods. 
Cost allocations (Skr X lo6)  
Allocation method A H K L M T Total 
Proportional to population 10.13 21 .OO 3.19 8.22 34.22 7.07 83.82 
Proportional to demand 13.07 16.01 7.30 6.87 28.48 12.08 83.82 
SC RB 19.54 13.28 5.62 10.90 16.66 17.82 83.82 
Shapley value 20.01 10.71 6.61 10.37 16.94 19.18 83.82 
Nucleolus 20.35 12.06 5.00 8.61 18.32 19.49 83.82 
Weak nucleolus 20.03 12.52 3.94 9.07 18.54 19.71 83.82 
Proportional nucleolus 20.36 12.46 3.52 8.67 18.82 19.99 83.82 
Note that the "proportional" allocations differ markedly from the others. 
A comparison of the proportional allocations with the costs of going alone 
(Table 7) reveals that these methods would charge some participants in the joint 
project more than they would have had to pay on their own. Allocation by 
demand penalizes M for participating, while allocation by population penalizes 
both H and M. 
This failure to  satisfy the requirement of individual rationality is based on 
the fact that proportional methods do not take into account crucial differences 
among the participants in their access to sources of supply. The proportional 
procedures work against H and M, which have large populations, and favor the 
' a Prooorrtonal ro oopuiarlon 
0.4 { 9 Proport~onal 10 aemand 
I SCRB 
/ 1 Shaolev value 
1 7  ! ~1 Nucleolus 
1 131 weak nucleolus 
0.34 3 P ~ O Q O . ~ . O " ~ I  n~c1e01.s 
I 
Municipal groups 
FIGURE 7 The shares of the total cost allocated to each group by the seven methods studied. 
TABLE 7 Individual and marginal costs (Skr X 1 o6 ) for each group in the Swed- 
ish case study. 
Inhvidual alternative costs 2 1.95 17.08 10.9 1 15.88 20.81 21.98 
Marginal costs 17.36 9.85 0.82 6.40 12.89 14.06 
outlying regions A and T.  The inclusion of A and T is relatively costly, despite 
their smaller populations, because they are both remote from the major sources 
of supply. This fact is reflected in their high marginal costs (Table 7). Though 
A and T should be charged at least the marginal cost of including them, both 
proportional methods fail to do so. This is one serious disadvantage of the pro- 
portional allocation methods. 
More seemingly reasonable than the proportional schemes, but actually 
almost as ill-behaved, is the SCRB method. This method is individually rational 
only if the alternative costs are less than the corresponding benefits (as assumed 
in the present case) ; otherwise this may not be so. It also may not satisfy group 
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rationality. For example, the three adjacent municipal groups H, K, and L can 
provide municipal water for themselves at a cost of Skr 27.26 million, but the 
SCRB method would assess them a total of Skr 29.80 million if they all shared 
in a regional facility. It would not be in the interest of H, K, and L to participate 
on the basis of such an assessment, because they are then, in effect, being forced 
to subsidize the other participants. Since there exist assessments in which no 
coahtion subsidizes any other, such an allocation could be considered inequita- 
ble. 
That the SCRB method suffers from t h s  defect is not surprising, since it 
considers only the marginal costs of including individual participants, not the 
marginal costs of coalitions. In thls case, the marginal cost of including both M 
and T is much higher than the sum of their individual marginal costs, since if one 
is already being served the additional expense of serving the other (or individual 
margin2 cost) is low. Thus, while it is not necessary to estimate all cost elements 
in order to calculate the SCRB allocation, this shortcut has a price: it may result 
in a less equitable final distribution. 
By contrast, a calculation of the Shapley value requires the alternative 
costs for all possible subsets. Unfortunately,however, this allocation also fails 
the group rationality and marginality tests. In particular, the Shapley value as- 
sesses the coalition HKL at Skr 430,000 more than its alternative cost. 
Since goup rationality and marginal cost coverage seem to be essential 
from the staridpoint of equity, as well as to provide sufficient incentives for co- 
operation, the remaining three methods - the nucleolus, weak nucleolus, and 
proportional nucleolus - are potentially more desirable than those discussed 
above, as they always produce a core imputation if one exists. Is there any basis 
for preferring one method to another? 
A general point raised in the early study by Ransmeier (1942) is that a 
method should be able toadapt to changing conditions. The need for adaptability 
is evident in the fact that, typically, total project costs are not known precisely 
until after the project has been completed. Since the cost allocation method is 
usually agreed upon before the project has been started, it must specify how dif- 
ferent levels of total costs should be allocated. Such an agreement will initially 
be based on some best estimate of the costs of alternatives, but once an agree- 
ment has been reached the alternatives must be abandoned. It is therefore suffi- 
cient that a method specify how different levels of total costsshould be allocated 
for fixed levels of alternative costs. 
An elementary requirement of any such method is that if total costs in- 
crease then .no participant will be charged less; conversely, if total costs decrease, 
no participant will be required to pay more. This property is called monotonicity 
(Megiddo 1974), and is fundamental in problems of fair division (see, for exarn- 
ple, Huntington 1928, Balinski and Young 1974, 1975, 1977, 1979a, 1979b). 
Several of the methods considered so far do not possess t h s  fundamental prop 
erty. As an example, suppose that the total cost of the Swedish project involved 
an overmn of Skr 4 million, bringing the total to Skr 87.82 million (see Table 8). 
TABLE 8 Comparison of the allocations under increased cost with the initial 
allocations (Skr X 1 O0 ). 
Cost allocation (Skr X lo6)  
Total 
 location method 
Proportional to population 
Proportional to demand 
Shapley value 
Nucleolus 
Weak nucleolus 
Proportional nucleolus 
This situation could arise if the method used for supplying the whole coalition 
involved components that would not be cost-effective in any smaller coalition, 
for example, the large fixed costs required for an interbasin transfer project. In 
fact a project of this nature is currently under construction in Sweden, and the 
costs are already substantially more than predicted. 
Comparing the new allocations with the old (Table 8), we notice that the 
nucleolus requires K to  pay less even though the total cost of the project has in- 
creased. Similarly, the SCRB method allocates K Skr 160,000 less when costs 
increase. This nonmonotonic behavior suggests that the nucleolus and SCRB 
methods may not be reasonable cost allocation procedures. 
On the other hand, it is clear that methods which allocate costs in propor- 
tion to some single criterion, like population or use, must be monotonic. This is 
also the case for the Shapley vaiue, the weak nucleolus, and the proportional 
nucleolus. For the Shapley value and weak nucleolus, any change in total costs 
is distributed equally among the actors (see Appendix B).* However, this partic- 
ular way of dividing changes in costs is questionable. Why should all participants 
'The nonmonotonicity of the nucleolus was first pointed out by Megiddo (1974). 
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have to share unforeseen joint expenses equally, when their shares in the enter- 
prise are very different? Using the weak nucleolus, for example, it is quite pos- 
sible that a tiny participant, who iontrib~ites essentially no costs (or savings) to 
any coalition would still have to contribute as much to defray a cost overrun as 
would his giant neighbors. This kind of behavior seems ~lnacceptable.* 
Perhaps the fairest way of measuring the participants' shares in the enter- 
prise is not by their costs (most of which they might well have incurred acting 
alone), but rather by the amounts that they save by virtue of taking part in the 
enterprise as opposed to going alone. A reasonable scheme would be to divide 
any unforeseen costs in proportion to the benefits enjoyed. This is precisely the 
way in which the proportional nucleolus works (see Appendix B). 
9 SUMMARY 
Given the practical need to allocate the costs of a joint water resource facility 
among the different users, it is necessary to choose rationally among the many 
different methods of allocation available. Using a definite computational proce- 
dure itself provides some semblance of rationality. However, the justification of 
a method does not lie in the computational procedure employed. but in its be- 
havior in practice. Thus it is necessary to compare the different methods on the 
basis of principle. The literature on cost allocation suggests a number of such 
principles, including: simplicity, reasonable information requirements, adaptabil- 
ity (which includes monotonicity in costs), insensitivity to direct costs, individ- 
ual and group rationality, and marginal cost coverage. 
Seven different approaches have been selected for comparison from among 
the various methods discussed in the project evaluation and game theory litera- 
ture, and their performance evaluated by application to an actual municipal cost 
allocation problem in Sweden. One of the methods used most widely for multi- 
purpose projects, the SCRB method, suffers from a number of disadvantages. 
including nonmonotonicity in costs, failure to satisfy group rationality (and 
individual rationality in some cases), as well as failure to cover marginal costs 
for groups. The underlying SCRB idea of allocating costs in proportion to bene- 
fits is attractive; the difficulties seem to arise from the ad hoe introduction of 
marginal costs. A more sophisticated game theory method, the Shapley value, 
is monotonic and satisfies individual rationality, but, as shown by the Swedish 
example, may not satisfy group rationality when it is possible to do so. 
Three of the remaining methods - the nucleolus, weak nucleolus, and pro- 
portional nucleolus - always satisfy group rationality and marginal cost cover- 
age when it is possible to do so. However, the nucleolus seems unsatisfactory 
because it is not monotonic in costs. The weak nucleolus and proportional 
*The fact that a "dummy player" (i.e., one who contributes zero additional costs to any coalition) can be 
assessed positive costs by the weak nucleolus was fust pointed out by Reinhard Selten. 
nucleolus are both monotonic, but the latter allocates changes in costs in a man- 
ner more consistent with the benefits that the participants reap from the enter- 
prise. Hence, of all game theory methods considered here, the proportional nu- 
cleolus appears to be the most attractive. 
The game theory methods all suffer from the disadvantages that they are 
fairly complicated and require detailed information on costs. All of the methods 
except for the simplest proportional allocation schemes rely on information 
about demands and the optimal scale of development - information which in 
practice may be unreliable or nonexistent. T h s  is particularly true for long-term 
investment projects such as the Swedish case discussed above. It is therefore not 
surprising to find that a simple scheme based on allocating costs in proportion 
to the population was eventually chosen, since insufficient information was 
available to adopt a more equitable approach. 
APPENDIX A: COST OF WATER SUPPLY NETWORK 
This section describes the procedure used to  determine the capital costs of pipes 
and pumps necessary to supply the required amounts of water to the demand 
points shown in Table A l .  The distances between points (in parentheses) and 
TABLE A1 Incremental water demand for all municipalities in the study area 
for the period 1970- 1980.a 
Incremental Incremental 
water demand water demand 
Municipality (X lo6 rn3!y) Municipality (X lo6 rn'iyr) 
.&ngelholm 
Hoganas 
Klippan 
Astorp 
Bjuv 
Helsingborg 
Landskrona 
svalov 
Eslov 
Kavlinge 
Lund 
Malmo 
Burlov 
Staffanstorp 
Trelleborg 
veLIingeb 
h an$ 
~ k a n d  
svedalab 
~ a r a ~  
' ~ a k e n  irom Sydvatten. Prognos 7 3 .  
b ~ a r a  is included in the municipality oCSveda1a:Vellinge. Ring,and Skanor constitute a single municipality. 
their elevations are shown in Figure A l .  It is assumed that the pressure at each 
demand point does not depend on the arrangement by which the water is 
Hoganas 7 
I 
* 2s 
Biuv 
Sva lov 
La;ldskrona 
65 
4' 
6 /' 
~ o r n r n a q  
Malrno 9 
\ 1 4 '  30 Bava ( 1 4)\ \ 
Ringsjon 
Vombsjon 
\ '. 
\ Svedala 48 
t 
1 
Vellinge*l3 
\ - Pipelines existing in 1970 
..... New pipelines 
Trelleborg 5 a 
FIGURE A1 The water transmission network. The number at each node represents rhe ele- 
vation in m; the number in parentheses on  each arc represents the distance in km. 
supplied, as described in the text (p. 2O), and this allows us to treat each arc of 
the transmission network independently. The cost analysis of the network is 
therefore carried out arc by arc. 
The cost of water transmission includes the following components: 
Cost of pipelines C, = c l  L = ( 7  + d P ) L  (Skr) 
Cost of pumps C2 = c2 fP (Skr) 
Cost of electricity C3 = c 3 P  (Skr/yr) 
where 
cl  = Unit cost of piping (Skrlm) 
L = Length of pipe (m) 
c2 = Unit cost of pump (Skr/kW) 
f = Safety factor 
c3 = Unit cost of electricity (Skr/kW-yr) 
P = (9.8 l/E)QH = Effective capacity of pump (kW) 
Q = Flow of water in pipe (m3 Isec) 
H = Ho + IL = Required pumping head (m) 
H,, = Difference in altitude between origin and destination 
of pipe (m) 
I = Hydraulic gradient 
E = Pumping efficiency 
D = Pipe diameter (m) 
ci,/3,y = Coefficients 
The total annual cost of transmission is given by 
C =  (C, + C,)CRF + C, 
where 
( I  + ')" 
= Capital recover/ factor C w = ( l + i y - l  
i = Interest rate 
n = Amortization period (years) 
The total cost Cis a function of the pipe diameter D, the flow Q, the pump- 
ing head H, and the length of pipe L. These factors are related by the Hazen- 
Williams formula: 
where Cw is the Hazen-Williams coefficient. 
The economical pipe diameter D* is obtained as a function of the flow Q 
by letting aC/aD = 0: 
where 
a = (c, f CRF + c3 )(9.81/E) 
b = 1 0 . 7 ( ~ w ) - ' . ~ ~  
Similarly, the economical hydraulic gradient I* is obtained as 
The parameters are determined from Swedish data as follows: a = 477 Skr; P 
= 1.60; y = 150 Skr: E = 0.63; Cw = 100; f = 1.33; CRF = 0.0871 based on i 
= 0.06, n = 20 years; cz = 1893 SkrlkW; c3 = 613 SkrlkW-yr. 
The results are: 
The cost of treating water at Vombsjon includes the costs of filtration, 
pumping, and chlorination. The treatment at Ringsjon consists of screening, sed- 
imentation, coagulation, and filtration. Unfortunately the particular cost data 
on these unit processes were not avdable, so capital costs and the costs of opera- 
tion and maintenance (OIM) were estimated using available data. The cost of 
treating on-site groundwater includes the costs of pumping, filtration, and chlo- 
rination, and these z e r e  also estimated. The results of the cost analysis are given 
in Table A2, where Q is the flow of water through the treatment plant in hIrn3 lyr. 
TABLE A2 The cost of providing water from the three sources. 
Water source Cost Value Unit (X lo6) 
Vombsjon Capital C: = 2.31 50J" Skr 
o/M C~ v = 0.162 5°.91 Skr/yr 
Ringsjon Capital cf: = 3.68 5°.64 Skr 
om C; = 0.410 5°.64 Skrlyr 
Groundwater Capital ($ = 2.38 5O." Skr 
om < = 0.263 5°.82 Skriyr 
APPENDIX B: MONOTONICITY 
The weak least core is the set of optimal solutions to the linear program 
min E 
subject to 
C xi = v(1V) 
iv 
C xi > v(S) - EISI for all S C ilr 
S 
whlch is equivalent to 
min C (xi + E )  
N 
subject to 
C xi  = v(N) 
,v 
z (xi  + E )  > v(S) 
S 
for all S C N 
This is equivalent to solving 
min C xi' 
subject to 
C .ril > v(s) for all S C 'V 
S 
and letting .ri = xi' - E ,  where E = [ X  .rit - v()V)]/n. Since the x' program is 
independent of v(N), an increase in v(:V) simply has the effect of increasing E - 
and hence every component xi - by the same amount. The same holds for the 
weak nucleolus, hence the weak nucleolus is monotonic. The proof of monoton- 
icity of the Shapley value is left to the reader. 
The proportional least core is the set of optimal solutions to the linear pro- 
S a m  
min t 
subject to  
X xi = v(N) 
N 
C xi > ( 1  - t)v(S) for all S C N 
S 
where we assume that v(S) > 0 for some S f N to ensure existence. 
This isequivalent tosolving(B 1) and letting xi = X~'V('N)/C:~ xit. An increase 
in v(N) by a common proportion simply has the effect of increasing every com- 
ponent of xi by the same proportion. The same holds for the proportional nu- 
cleolus, henct: it is monotonic. 
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